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 Design of a compendium to deﬁne human biomonitoring sampling in a chemical incident.
 A single sampling approach (chemical, biological and radio-nuclear agents) is depicted.
 Human biomonitoring analysis methods are evaluated for 50 agents in civil protection.
 Holistic exposure data can be used to improve risk communication.
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A B S T R A C T
Human biological monitoring (HBM) is a well established tool in occupational and environmental
medicine. It allows to determine the internal dose of a chemical absorbed by an individual after acute or
chronic exposure. Biological reference and threshold values may be used to evaluate the internal dose
and estimate its health impact(s).
HBM and its advantages have not been broadly recognized from a civil protection point of view in
Germany, therefore we have designed a compendium to deﬁne state-of-the-art HBM sampling after a
release of chemicals in a civil protection scenario. The compendium integrates the sampling of biological
agents and the sampling of radio-nuclear target isotopes, to be analyzed by HBM, in a single sampling
approach, thus limiting burden on the potentially exposed persons and facilitating comparison of their
individual exposure to different CBRN agents. HBM analysis methods are evaluated and basic toxicity
data (including biological reference and threshold values) are given for a list of 50 agents, previously
identiﬁed as relevant in civil protection.
For on scene commanders and healthcare professionals the compendium may help to generate HBM
and biological–radio-nuclear (BRN) exposure data after a CBRN incident which can be used to improve
risk communication.
ã 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-
ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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Human biological monitoring (HBM) has been used as a tool for
prevention in occupational and environmental medicine for* Corresponding author. Tel.: +49 551 398046.
E-mail addresses: mmuelle3@gwdg.de (M. Müller), schmiechi@gmx.de
(K. Schmiechen), deike.heselmann@med.uni-goettingen.de (D. Heselmann),
lukas.schmidt@fau.de (L. Schmidt), Thomas.Goeen@ipasum.med.uni-erlangen.de
(T. Göen).
1 Tel.: +49 9131 8526121.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.toxlet.2014.09.017
0378-4274/ã 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open access 
nd/3.0/).several decades. Starting 1890 with the detection of lead in the
blood and urine of exposed workers, the application of HBM has
ever since steadily increased in many countries around the world
(Henschler, 2002; Göen, 2012).
1.1. Development of HBM in Germany
In Germany, the “Permanent Senate Commission for the
Investigation of Health Hazards of Chemical Compounds in the
Work Area” of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German
Research Council) has been and continues to be a constant driving-article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
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1972 the “working-group on analyses of biological materials” for
the development of standardized HBM methods was introduced in
the commission, followed by the foundation of the “working group
on the derivation of threshold values in biological materials” in
1979. In addition, members of the commission support the EU
Commission’s Scientiﬁc Committee for Occupational Exposure
Limits (SCOEL) (http://www.dfg.de/en/dfg_proﬁle/statutory_bod-
ies/senate/health_hazards/index.html).
In environmental medicine the “Human Biomonitoring Com-
mission” of the German Federal Environment Agency evaluates
different guidance values, e.g., “reference” and “HBM values”, since
1992. Brieﬂy, “reference values” reﬂect the background of a
chemical in representative biological specimens collected from the
German population, “HBM values” are health effect based guidance
values. Members of the commission support the EU HBM
development in environmental and public health since 2005 in
the projects ESBIO, COPHES and DEMOCOPHES (Smolders et al.,
2008; Smolders et al., 2008).
Dose monitoring, biochemical effect monitoring and biological
effect monitoring represent the three classical monitoring
approaches in HBM (Angerer, 2002). Dose monitoring includes
the detection and quantiﬁcation of xenobiotics and their metab-
olites in biological specimens. Biochemical effect monitoring
analyses reaction products of chemicals and their intermediates
with critical macromolecules like DNA or proteins. Biological effect
monitoring observes ﬁrst changes in somatic cells as reactions of
xenobiotic exposure through the determination of e.g., cytogenetic
or immunological parameters. The predictive value of the different
monitoring methods with respect to human health effects
increases in the order from dose monitoring via biochemical
effect monitoring to biological effect monitoring. In the last decade
the three monitoring approaches were supplemented with a
fourth approach: the determination of the individual disposition or
susceptibility. At a ﬁxed external exposure level the individual
disposition or susceptibility of each exposed person modulates the
internal dose, the biochemical and the biological effects. In an
extreme case a susceptible person may show symptoms of
intoxication while its non-susceptible counter-part is not affected.
At present, HBM parameters of susceptibility focus on the
description of human polymorphisms in enzyme activities, for
example xenobiotic metabolizing enzymes, DNA repair enzyme
systems and enzymes regulating oxidative stress (Müller and
Hallier, 2012).
With respect to legal and public communication issues the
application of HBM in occupational and environmental medicine
calls for a high quality standard for the entire procedure including
specimen sampling, sample preparation, analytical determination,
post-analytical evaluation and communication of the HBM results.
Thus, the development of standard operating procedures (SOP) has
been encouraged and pursued by the “working-group on analyses
of biological materials” of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
(Göen et al., 2012b). The working group comprises of experts who
possess the experience in developing, applying and validating
biomonitoring procedures. The members are ready to examine
those biomonitoring procedures in practice. Analytical procedures
are adopted by the working group only after a thorough
examination, which includes a reproduction of the method in at
least one laboratory by an independent expert. Currently more
than 200 of these SOP are available in English (DFG,
1985–2004DFG, 1985–2004; DFG, 2006–2013DFG, 2006–2013;
Göen et al., 2012b). In addition, an external quality assessment
scheme (German External QUality Assessment Scheme–G-EQUAS)
with certiﬁcation for occupational-medical and environmental-
medical toxicological analyses in biological materials was founded
in 1982. Today, up to 200 laboratories from more than 35 countriesparticipate in this scheme on a regular basis (Göen et al., 2012a).
Most participants of the programme are laboratories with
extended experience in biomonitoring, which are interested to
control reliability and quality of biomonitoring results.
1.2. Application of HBM in chemical incidents and CBRN scenarios
In the case of a CBRN incident in Germany there are two
different populations at risk: the ﬁrst group is the general
population and the second group are the disaster relief forces,
which include both professional and voluntary units. Healthcare
for the general population is provided by the public healthcare
authorities of the German states and the federal government,
while healthcare for the professional and voluntary disaster relief
forces is granted by the German social accident insurance (http://
www.dguv.de/en/index.jsp) using the help of occupational
physicians.
HBM has previously proven to be a versatile tool in the
aftermath of an accidental chemical release with exposure of the
public in the hands of the German public healthcare authorities in
the 90’s of the past century (Heudorf and Peters, 1994, 1997;
Heudorf et al., 1997; Heudorf, 1998). In 2002, HBM was again
successfully used in the Bad Münder epichlorohydrin freight train
accident for the assessment of long-term health effects of the
potentially exposed persons (Wollin et al., 2008; Wollin et al., 2014,
this issue). As a consequence of the incident the “Human
Biomonitoring Commission” of the German Federal Environment
Agency issued a “recommendation for the usage of HBM for
chemical release related to accidents or non-normal conditions of
operation with exposure of the public”. The recommendation
“includes the informed consent of the affected individuals and the
data security, the selection of applicable parameters and materials
for sampling, the collection of samples including documentation
and the logistics regarding shipping and handling of the samples”
(Empfehlungen des Umweltbundesamtes, 2006). A list of sub-
stances/parameters which can be determined successfully by HBM
is also provided (for example metals, organic solvents, aromatic
amines, nitro compounds and some metabolites of the substance
groups). Most important, the recommendation describes what
may be called the “public interest–legal liability approach for the
application of chemical incident HBM”, e.g., the obligate and
immediate collection of human specimens after the accidental
release of a chemical. The request for the ultimate safe-guarding of
samples to be analysed by HBM allows the generation of exposure
data on an individual and group basis to assure appropriate risk
communication and respond to legal liability cases. The approach
involves two pathways: if the substance is known and a HBM
method is available “targeted HBM” may be applied and the
appropriate human specimens (for example urine, blood, serum,
plasma, erythrocytes) will be collected. If the substance is
unknown or a HBM method for a known substance is not available
only urine will be collected for “validated HBM” after
the development of a new HBM analysis method. Spontaneous
urine samples can be easily collected from adults and from
children (with the informed consent of their parents) and may be
stored deep-frozen until analysis. In addition, ethical consider-
ations ask for the appropriate use of a sample collected in an
invasive manner, while there is no ethical problem to discard urine
sample collected in a non-invasive manner, in those cases in which
no adequate HBM analysis method can be developed.
In contrast to the German recommendation Dutch public health
researchers have designed a HBM application strategy which may
be called the “pre-deﬁned transparent procedure for early
decision-making concerning application of HBM following chemi-
cal incidents” (Scheepers et al., 2011; Scheepers et al., 2014, this
issue). They propose a stepwise procedure to rapidly decide about
308 M. Müller et al. / Toxicology Letters 231 (2014) 306–314the usefulness and feasibility of applying HBM. Starting with
ambient measurements and dispersion modeling, ambient expo-
sure in a chemical incident is estimated. If the ambient exposure
exceeds intervention values for emergency response (IVERs), e.g.,
the exposure is sufﬁciently high to induce adverse health effects,
the application of HBM may be considered. IVERs that perfectly ﬁt
the demand to describe the onset of adverse health effects after the
release of a chemical are the US EPA acute exposure guideline
levels (AEGL) (http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/). Within the system
the AEGL-2 value is of special importance as it marks the transition
level for health-threatening exposure. If adverse health effects can
be anticipated the decision process advances by considering the
key parameters availability and persistence of biomarkers in
biological tissues, mechanism of toxicity, and sensitivity of the
analysis of a biomarker. At any step (except one) along the
proposed decision tree the answer “No” prompts the person in
charge to stop the application of HBM. The decision whether to
apply HBM (or not) needs to be motivated to the potentially
exposed population and information gathered within the proce-
dure may help to make the decision-making process transparent
and convince the public of its accuracy. Scheepers et al. (2011)
present comprehensive datasheets for a preliminary selection of
15 substances based on the Dutch “Register Risk SituationsTable 1
List of substances and substance groups relevant in civil protection (Burbiel et al.,
2009).
Toxic industrial chemical (TIC) Warfare agent Biotoxin
Acrylonitrile Amiton, Tetram, VG Botulinum
toxin
Ammonia BZ, quinuclidinyl
benzilate
Ricin
Arsine Lewisite Saxitoxin,
STX
Benzene Nitrogen Mustard (HN-1,
HN-2, HN-3)
Boron trichloride
Boron triﬂuoride Organophosphates
Bromine Sarin, agent GB
Carbamates Soman, agent GD
Carbon disulﬁde Sulfur mustard
Carbon monoxide Tabun, agent GA
Chlorine VX, agent VX
Chloroform, trichloromethane
Chloropicrine
Diborane, boroethane
Dioxin: 2,3,7,8-
Tetrachlorodibenzodioxin (2,3,7,8-
TCDD)
Ethylene oxide, epoxyethane
Fluorine
Furane
Hydrochloric acid
Hydrogen bromide
Hydrogen cyanide
Hydrogen ﬂuoride
Hydrogen sulﬁde
Methyl isocyanate (MIC)
Parathione, diethyl parathione
Perﬂuoroisobutene,
perﬂuoroisobutylene
Phenol
Phosgene
Phosphorus trichloride
Phosphorus oxychloride
Nitric acid
Nitrogen oxides
Sulfur dioxide
Sulfuric acid
1,1,2,2-Tetrachloroethane
Tetrachloromethane, carbon
tetrachloride
Vinyl chloride, chloroethyleneHazardous Substances” to which their decision making procedure
can be applied. Advantages and disadvantages of both approaches
will be considered in detail in Section 4.
While public health authorities in Germany and the
Netherlands are well aware of the added value of HBM for the
general population in a chemical incident, HBM and its advantages
have not been broadly recognized from a civil protection point of
view. As indicated above the healthcare of potentially exposed
disaster relief forces in Germany differs from the healthcare of the
general population. Although a few national guidelines, e.g., the
occupational medical guideline for biomonitoring (AfAMed, 2013)
and the manual for disaster relief forces in a CBRN incident (“SKK-
DV 500”) (http://www.dgkm.org/ﬁles/downloads/cbrn/Einheite-
n_im_CBRN-Einsatz_-_SKK-Dienstvorschrift_500.pdf), recom-
mend the application of HBM for disaster relief forces, most on
scene commanders and many healthcare professionals other than
the public health authorities are not aware of HBM as a versatile
tool in the aftermath of a chemical scenario.
Moreover, modern civil protection has to respond to scenarios,
which may involve the additional release of biological agents and
of radio-nuclear agents together with chemicals, resulting in CBRN
incidents. As an example a terrorist attack may involve all three
threats concomitantly. In this case, speciﬁc BRN measurement
methods need to be applied, although HBM monitoring
radio-nuclear target isotopes may also be used. Nevertheless, a
single sampling approach for HBM and the other measurement
procedures will be favorable. This may limit burden on the
potentially exposed persons and facilitate comparison of their
individual exposure to different CBRN agents.
Identifying these needs in civil protection prompted us to
design a compendium to deﬁne state-of-the-art HBM sampling
after a release of chemicals in a civil protection scenario together
with a single sampling approach for the BRN measurement
procedures. In addition, HBM analysis methods are evaluated and
basic toxicity data (including biological reference and threshold
values) are given for a list of 50 substances and substance groups,
previously identiﬁed as relevant in civil protection (Table 1,
Supplementary information 1). Thus, the compendium may help to
generate HBM and BRN exposure data following a CBRN incident
which can be used to improve risk communication.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Selection of chemical substances and substance groups in a civil
protection scenario
During a project, initiated by the “commission on civil
protection of the federal ministry of the interior” (http://www.
schutzkommission.de/SubSites/SK/EN/Home/home_node.html) a
list of 50 chemical substances and substance groups was prepared
(Burbiel et al., 2009). Special emphasis was laid on a civil
protection point of view by considering the abuse of chemicals
for terrorist attacks. Initially, different lists of chemicals from
military sources, for example from NATO (STANAG 2909, 2002),
and civilian sources like the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlistchem.asp)
were compared and a consensus list was created. While most of
the sources focused on the toxicity data to establish a ranking of
importance Burbiel et al. designed a scoring system to evaluate the
key parameters “availability”, “application” and “socio–economic
impact” in addition.
2.2. Literature search for HBM analysis methods and toxicity data
A thorough literature research for the respective HBM analysis
methods was conducted including inter alia the “The MAK
Collection for Occupational Health and Safety” (http://
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“Biomonitoring Auskunftssystem” of the German Federal Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health (http://www.baua.de/de/The-
men-von-A-Z/Gefahrstoffe/Biomonitoring/Auskunftsystem.html)
and the PubMed (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov). Basic toxicity
data and biological reference and threshold values were retrieved
inter alia from the following data bases and agency homepages:
“The MAK Collection for Occupational Health and Safety” (http://
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/book/10.1002/3527600418/topics), the
“Vereinigung zur Förderung des Deutschen Brandschutzes Referat
10–Umweltschutz” (http://www.vfdb-10.de), the German Federal
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (http://www.baua.de/
en/Homepage.html), the German Federal Environment Agency
(http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/en), the United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/)
and the PubMed (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov). HBM analysis
methods were evaluated and classiﬁed according to the following
criteria:
- Standard operating procedures (SOP) for HBM
This category comprised HBM analysis methods evaluated and
published by scientiﬁc or governmental associations, institutions
or agencies. The procedures are commonly accepted and used on a
regular basis by the HBM analytics community. For several HBM
parameters biological reference or threshold values, e.g., the
“biologischer Arbeitsstoffreferenzwert” (BAR) (Göen et al., 2012c)
or the biological tolerance value (BAT) were established, applying
such methods. Due to the high degree of standardization
measurement results of different laboratories will be comparable
to each other if determined using the same SOP. Examples for this
category are benzene and arsine.
- Non-standardized HBM analysis methods
This category comprised well described HBM analysis methods,
published in peer-reviewed journals. These methods have not yet
been evaluated by scientiﬁc or governmental associations,
institutions or agencies. The procedures have to be established
at an expert laboratory and measurement results need to be
reviewed by independent experts. Moreover, biological reference
or threshold values are often not available to evaluate the results.
Examples for this category are boron (in boron trichloride, boron
triﬂuoride, diborane) and furane.
- HBM method not available
This category contains chemical substances for which HBM
analysis methods are not yet available. A default sampling protocol
is recommended and calls for the collection of urine spot samples
of the potentially exposed persons and deep-frozen storage of the
specimens (preferred temperature: 80 C). Meanwhile HBM
experts can evaluate, whether a new analysis method can be
designed and evaluated to measure the stored samples in due time.
Examples for this category are chloropicrine and perﬂuoroisobu-
tene.
2.3. List of HBM laboratories and German poison information centres
To create a list of high quality standard HBM laboratories
interested to support physicians in the collection and analysis of
human specimens after a chemical incident the G-EQUAS was used
as an information exchange platform. Accompanying the ofﬁcial
invitation of the 44th G-EQUAS (fall 2009) a questionnaire in
German was sent out to regional HBM laboratories. In addition, the
members of the “working-group on analyses of biologicalmaterials” of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft were
addressed. The registration form to be returned to the authors
involved a declaration of consent, full address of the HBM
laboratory (postal address, phone and fax number), contact
person(s), ofﬁce hours/availability, and analytical focus (organic
chemicals/inorganic chemicals/both). The efforts resulted in a list
of 13 HBM laboratories.
Poison information centres may help on scene commanders
and healthcare professionals to gain toxicological information on
chemicals, to coordinate HBM campaigns and to get access to high
quality standard HBM laboratories. Thus, a list of the poison
information centres is included in the compendium (https://www.
klinitox.de/index.php?id=3).
3. Results
In Germany a compendium was designed to introduce and
facilitate the use of HBM and BRN measurement methods in a
single approach following CBRN incidents. The compendium was
published in 2012 as a guideline in the publication series
“Forschung im Bevölkerungsschutz” of the German Federal Ofﬁce
of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) (Müller and
Schmiechen, 2012). This paper brieﬂy describes the main results of
the research project.
3.1. Concept of the compendium
The concept of the compendium serves two major aims. First
aim is to provide information to on scene commanders and
healthcare professionals for state-of-the-art HBM sampling after a
release of chemicals in a civil protection scenario together with a
single sampling approach for the BRN measurement procedures.
The expected beneﬁts of the uniﬁed sampling strategy in the case
of a concomitant release of several CBRN agents is to limit burden
on the potentially exposed persons and facilitate comparison of
their individual exposure to different CBRN agents. The second aim
is to evaluate HBM analysis methods and to provide basic toxicity
data (including biological reference and threshold values) for a list
of 50 agents.
As a consequence the compendium consists of two parts. After
giving general information part 1 focuses on sampling of human
specimens for HBM and BRN measurement procedures. Part
2 contains short proﬁles of 50 substances and substance groups,
previously identiﬁed as relevant in civil protection.
3.2. Compendium part 1
3.2.1. State-of-the-art HBM
The compendium part 1 introduces the reader to the three
stages of an HBM procedure: the pre-analytical stage, the
analytical stage and the post-analytical stage. A clear focus is laid
on the pre-analytical stage, which involves sampling preparations,
ethics, communication and sample collection (Fig. 1).
3.2.2. Sampling preparations for HBM
In the pre-analytical stage advise is given to the acting physician
with respect to analyte/parameter selection, sample matrices and
time points for sample collection. Considering the average
metabolic half life times of chemicals, time windows for the
collection of samples after exposure are predeﬁned: urine
metabolites 1–2 days, albumin adducts 1–10 days, DNA adducts
1–20 days, hemoglobin adducts 1–60 days (maximum 120 days).
Specimen cups for the matrices urine, blood, faeces and saliva are
depicted in detail and sources of supply are mentioned. With
respect to the transport of the human specimens the threefold
containment of the biological samples is described: for example a
Sequence of stages in human biomonitoring 
Pre-analytical stage 
- Sampling preparations 
- Ethics: 
  Informed consent 
- Communication: 
  Medical interview 
  Self-reported exposure 
- Sample collection 
Analytical  stage
- Sample preparation
- Analytical determination 
- Data collection
- Quality management
Post-analytical stage
- Evaluation of the
  analytical results
- Medical evidence
- Evaluation of the
  results by experts
Fig. 1. Sequence of stages in human biomonitoring.
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and a rigid cardboard box. Furthermore, a brief overview of the
most relevant parts of the national and international transport
guidelines for human specimens is given. The interaction with the
HBM laboratory involves a ﬁrst estimate of the number of collected
samples, the allocation of appropriate capacities by the laboratory
and specialities in sampling and transport. A decision has to be
made, whether the samples are stored prior to transport or not. In
addition, proper ﬁnancial support and how to organize sample
collection of human specimens by authorized physicians in line
with the public health system for the general population and
the insurance system for the disaster relief forces in Germany are
considered.
3.2.3. Ethics, communication and HBM sample collection
Ethics is always an important issue in the context of HBM.
Several experts have dealt with this subject with regard to
scientiﬁc HBM studies (Casteleyn et al., 2010; Moodie and Evans,
2011; Quigley, 2012). However, the principle task of the application
of HBM in the aftermath of chemical incidents is not scientiﬁc
evaluation but the supply of additional speciﬁc diagnostics, which
proves the extent of the individual exposure to a single chemical or
a chemical mixture. Thus, the ethical criteria, which have to be
considered for the application of HBM in CBRN scenarios, are
comparable with the general ethical issues of medical diagnostics
(Engelhardt 1980; Decker et al., 2013).
Communication is another crucial issue in the whole process. It
comprises crisis communication with the exposed groups and the
public and individual communication with trained crisis interven-
tion personnel and physicians. In line with the ethical guidelines of
medical diagnostics for HBM the acting physician needs to inform
the patient on the tasks and risks of the planned examination and
request an informed consent of the patient prior to the sampling of
the specimens. Therefore a ready-to-copy informed consent form
is part of the compendium. Ideally the physician can give the
patient information on the medical follow-up while collecting the
sample. If this is not the case a contact point, e.g., the local public
health authorities, needs to be assigned by the on scene
commander to coordinate crisis/risk communication and commu-
nication of HBM results in the aftermath.
Prior to sample collection exposed persons have to be
decontaminated to avoid exposure of the medical personal. Basicrules of hygiene and personal protection have to be obeyed during
the sampling process. In a medical interview the physician may ask
for personal data and general HBM inﬂuencing factors like
smoking, medication and food consumption, e.g., eating ﬁsh and
seafood modulates levels of arsenic in blood and urine. In addition
self-reported exposure data shall be gathered. This comprises
time-point and duration of exposure, status (person of the general
population/member of the disaster relief forces), proximity to the
source of exposure, personal or technical protection equipment
(yes/no), signs of intoxication and medical treatment so far. For
self-reported exposure data a ready-to-copy form is included in the
compendium, the human specimens collected can be documented
on the same data sheet. The generated documents and the
collected specimen(s) need to be assigned to the exposed
individual without doubt anytime during the HBM process. Ideally
a unique code number or barcode label(s) supplied by the HBM
laboratory are used for this purpose.
As already indicated in the introduction the ultimate safe-
guarding of samples in line with the “public interest–legal liability
approach for the application of chemical incident HBM” is the
preferred way to implement HBM in a CBRN incident in Germany.
Therefore, if the substance is unknown or a HBM method for a
known substance is not available urine sampling is requested for
“validated HBM” after the development of a new HBM analysis
method. Spontaneous urine samples can be easily collected from
adults and children (with an informed consent of their parents)
and may be stored deep-frozen until analysis. For the assessment
of the spontaneous urine samples (concentrated/diluted urine) the
determination of creatinine is recommended prior to analysis.
3.2.4. Sampling of biological agents
Among others bacteria, fungi and viruses are prominent
examples for biological agents relevant in civil protection
scenarios. Moreover, biotoxins need to be considered. While many
of the other biological agents give rise to infectious diseases,
biotoxins may cause intoxications. Therefore, three biotoxins,
namely botulinum toxin, ricin and saxitoxin were included in the
list of the 50 agents of the compendium.
Although the health impact of a biological agent is generally
delayed, potential exposure in a CBRN scenario is of great concern
to the persons affected. In Germany the public healthcare
authorities of the German states and the Robert Koch Institute
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page_node.html) organize human specimen sampling and labora-
tory diagnostics. Microbiological detection methods of biological
agents involve microscopy, cultivation of pathogens, polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) analysis and antigen and antibody detection.
In addition to the sampling methods described for HBM, which can
be used for biological agents as well, the compendium brieﬂy
describes special specimen sampling techniques for biological
agents to allow a single sampling approach, thus limiting burden
on the potentially exposed persons and facilitating comparison of
their individual exposure to different CBRN agents.
3.2.5. Exposure monitoring to radio-nuclear agents and HBM of RN
target isotopes
Individuals may be exposed to radioactivity in three ways:
ionizing radiation directly from a source, contamination due to
direct contact with radioactive agents and uptake of radioactive
agents in the body. Exposure of persons to radiation can be stopped
by shielding or safe removal of the source and radioactive agents
may be decontaminated. In contrast, incorporation involves
absorption of the radioactive agents in the body, metabolism
and excretion. Radioactive agents can exert classical chemical
toxicity and radio-toxicity resulting in somatic and genetic
damage, either acute or delayed. Radioactive exposure can be
detected using biological dosimetry, e.g., determination of
radionuclide activity in the body or in the organs, determination
of radionuclide activity concentration in excretions or measure-
ment of chromosome abberations. The determination of radionu-
clide activity concentration in excretions calls for a 24 h urine
collection (pre-cleaned specimen cups are supplied by the
analyzing laboratory, urine needs to be acidiﬁed (10 mL HNO3
(65%)/L urine)). The Federal Ofﬁce for Radiation protection (http://
www.bfs.de/en/bfs) supports and coordinates radioactive expo-
sure monitoring. A network of “Approved Laboratories for
Incorporation Monitoring (ALIM)” is available in Germany.
In addition, HBM of radio-nuclear (RN) target isotopes may
support the data supplied by the other RN measurement
procedures. Generally, radioactive agents released by accidents,
military or criminal activities are seldom single pure nuclides, but
they consist more likely of mixtures of isotopes of several chemical
moieties. Most of these mixtures contain uranium, which may be
used as target isotope for initial appraisal of RN exposure. A HBM
standard operating procedure of the “working-group on analyses
of biological materials” of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft is
capable of detecting and quantifying 232thorium and 238uranium in
blood and urine (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/book/10.1002/
3527600418/topics). This procedure can be used to detect
background levels of 238uranium in human specimens of the
general population. Since some mineral waters in Germany contain
uranium, thorough investigation of HBM inﬂuencing factors by the
acting physician prior to HBM analysis is advised.
With respect to the transport of potentially radioactive human
specimens, radioactive monitoring of the samples has to be
conducted and an ofﬁcial clearance has to be issued by
the appropriate authorities. After the clearance the transport of
the human specimens has to conducted in line with the
recommendations outlined above.
3.3. Compendium part 2
3.3.1. Proﬁles of chemical substances and substance groups
In the compendium part 2 HBM analysis methods are evaluated.
Basic toxicity data, including biological reference and threshold
values are given for a list of 50 agents, previously identiﬁed as
relevant in civil protection (Burbiel et al., 2009). The list comprises
of 37 substances and substance groups classiﬁed as “ToxicIndustrial Chemicals” (TIC), 9 substances and 1 substance group
classiﬁed as warfare agents and 3 biotoxins (Table 1). The proﬁles
include the following items, if applicable, for each chemical
substance or substance group:
- Name(s) (German, English), UN- and CAS number(s)
- IVERs (German “Einsatztoleranzwert”, US EPA AEGL-2 (4 h));
German occupational air threshold values, German biological
reference and threshold values
- Basic toxicity data: toxicokinetics, acute and chronic toxic
effects
- HBM sampling: biological matrix, timepoint of sampling,
pretreatment, conditions of storage
- HBM method: brief evaluation and classiﬁcation of the method
(s) (standard operating procedure for HBM/non-standardized
HBM analysis method/HBM method not available)
- Brief introduction to literature: references of HBM method(s)
and basic toxicity data
Supplementary information 1 presents a list of the 50 agents
with condensed proﬁles including name(s), CAS-number(s), HBM
method(s): parameter, LOD, reference(s).
In addition, the HBM data base of the German Federal Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health (http://www.baua.de/de/The-
men-von-A-Z/Gefahrstoffe/Biomonitoring/Auskunftsystem.html)
can be used to identify HBM methods of chemical substances and
substance groups not included in the compendium.
3.3.2. List of HBM laboratories and poison information centres
A list of high quality standard HBM laboratories interested to
support physicians in the collection and analysis of human
specimens after a chemical incident was created in cooperation
with the G-EQUAS and the “working-group on analyses of
biological materials” of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.
Currently this network comprises of 13 HBM laboratories; anybody
interested to be included in the planned update of the list is
encouraged to contact the authors of this article. Supplementary
information 2 presents the list of HBM laboratories, each with full
address (postal address, phone and fax number), contact person(s),
ofﬁce hours/availability, and analytical focus (organic chemicals/
inorganic chemicals/both).
Since poison information centres can support on scene
commanders and healthcare professionals with toxicological
information on chemicals, coordinate HBM campaigns and
facilitate access to high quality standard HBM laboratories a list
of the German poison information centres is included in the
compendium (https://www.klinitox.de/index.php?id=3).
4. Discussion
Chemical incidents warrant a rapid decision whether HBM shall
be applied and clear strategies for collection of biological samples,
HBM analysis and communication on the outcomes of a HBM study
to an individual or group in the aftermath. From a European
perspective two alternative approaches are offered: the German
“public interest–legal liability approach for the application of
chemical incident HBM” (Empfehlungen des Umweltbundesamtes,
2006; this article) and the Dutch “pre-deﬁned transparent
procedure for early decision-making concerning application of
HBM following chemical incidents” (Scheepers et al., 2011;
Scheepers et al., 2014, this issue). Both procedures share important
features, nevertheless there are also obvious differences.
With respect to the selection of agents the ﬁrst approach covers
a list of 50 chemical substances and substance groups (Burbiel
et al., 2009). In creating this compilation special emphasis was laid
on a civil protection point of view through considering the abuse of
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Burbiel et al. designed a scoring system to evaluate the key
parameters “availability”, “application” and “socio–economic
impact” to establish a ranking of importance. The second approach
comprises of 15 chemical substances and substance groups from a
public health point of view. The selection is partially based on
practical toxicological experiences and considerations, e.g., sub-
stances being important constituents of process emissions and
ﬁres or identiﬁcation as acute exposure threshold level case study
substances. Moreover, the key parameter “availability” plays an
important role as the relevance of the chemical substances and
substance groups was assessed based on the Dutch “Register Risk
Situations Hazardous Substances”. The registry highlights nation-
wide the frequency of occurrence of chemical substances using the
format of risk maps (http://www.risicokaart.nl). The use of the
identical criterion “availability” in both procedures results in 47%
match (7/15 of the Dutch list) of identiﬁed hazardous substances,
namely acrylonitrile, arsine, benzene, dioxine, ethylene oxide,
hydrogen cyanide and hydrogen ﬂuoride. This may form a nucleus
for a future European consensus list.
The two approaches supply for each chemical substance or
substance group CAS-number(s), basic toxicity data, IVERs
(especially US EPA AEGL-2 values), occupational air and biological
threshold values and HBM procedure data. Following their
individual aims, the German compendium emphasizes the obligate
HBM sampling process and facilitates the introduction of its users
to the interpretation of the HBM results, while the Dutch
procedure focuses on the decision making process whether or
not HBM should be applied. A unique feature of the German
approach is the integration of the sampling of BRN agents in
biological matrices together with HBM specimens in a single
sampling approach to limit burden on the potentially exposed
persons and to facilitate comparison of their individual exposure to
different CBRN agents.
Prior to a detailed comparison of both procedures the basis of
the “pre-deﬁned transparent procedure for early decision-making
concerning application of HBM following chemical incidents” has
to be considered. As already indicated in the introduction, the US
EPA Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGL) (http://www.epa.gov/
oppt/aegl/) are the IVERs of choice to describe the onset of adverse
health effects after the release of a chemical. Within the system the
AEGL-2 value is of special importance as it marks the transitionTable 2
Comparison of the proposed German and Dutch approaches to HBM following chemic
Aspect Public interest–legal liability approach (this article) 
Field of application CBRN incidents 
Principle Obligate and immediate collection of human specimen 
Decision on usefulness of
HBM
Delayed 
HBM method
development for safe-
guarded samples
Possible 
Coverage of internal
exposure and legal
liability data
Not and likely affected persons 
Public and media
demand for action
Fully satisﬁed 
Level of preparedness Moderate 
Training of HBM
executing personnel
Healthcare professionals can receive an on-site
introduction to HBM sample collection in addition to
their basic skills
Availability and
allocation of resources
High level level for health-threatening exposure. Ambient monitoring com-
bined with simple dispersion modeling like ALOHA result in a
uniform AEGL-2 contour on which the further decision-making
process may rely as exempliﬁed by Scheepers et al. (2011). Recent
advances in dispersion modeling indicate a non-uniform disper-
sion of chemicals from a given chemical incident source depending
on several factors, inter alia meteorological conditions and existing
development, resulting in “hot spots” of high concentrations of a
chemical (e.g., >AEGL-2 level) and areas of low concentrations (e.g.,
<<AEGL-2 level) (Schatzmann and Leitl, 2009; Harms et al., 2011).
Thus, the application of simple dispersion modeling in a chemical
incident scenario is of limited value, while current in situ ambient
monitoring data shall be preferred for the decision making process.
AEGL values clearly reﬂect inhalative exposure. Consequently,
Scheepers et al. emphasize the relationships of ambient exposure
levels and biomarker levels for their toxicokinetic considerations
(Scheepers et al., 2011). This is a pragmatic approach for most
chemical incidents. Nevertheless, dermal exposure should not be
underestimated, e.g., in scenarios when chemicals soak the clothes
of exposed persons or personal protection equipment of disaster
relief forces gets damaged or is not functioning properly.
The major difference between both approaches is the decision
on usefulness of HBM. All other issues to be discussed are
consequences of this Table 2. The “public interest–legal liability
approach for the application of chemical incident HBM” warrants
the obligate immediate collection of human specimens after the
accidental release of a chemical. This is in line with recommen-
dations of the WHO to obtain blood and urine samples from the
exposed workers and members of the affected population if
possible in the given scenario (WHO, 1997; WHO 2009). The safe-
guarding of HBM samples raises hopes of the exposed persons to
determine their individual exposure and to describe their personal
health impacts based on their internal doses in the future. These
hopes may be fulﬁlled if a well-established HBM method exists,
which is conducted by a qualiﬁed laboratory, but if efforts fail to
develop an adequate HBM analysis disappointment at least in parts
of the affected population will be on hand. Although the delay of
the decision on usefulness of HBM opens the option to develop a
HBM method for the safe-guarded urine samples, it may not lead to
the intended positive results in all cases. In contrast, the
“pre-deﬁned transparent procedure for early decision-making
concerning application of HBM following chemical incidents”al incidents.
Pre-deﬁned transparent procedure for early decision-making concerning
application of HBM following chemical incidents (Scheepers et al., 2011)
Chemical incidents
Pre-deﬁned transparent procedure for early decision-making concerning
application of HBM
Immediate
HBM is not applied if method of analysis is not available at the time a decision is
made
Likely affected persons
Not engaging in HBM is a possible outcome which requires communication
Moderate
Experts are trained on the procedure to prepare and implement a HBM campaign
that is carried out in collaboration with the community health service and local
hospital
Moderate level
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supported by scientiﬁc data. Consequently, the option to develop a
HBM method for obligate collected specimens is not provided and
the raise of false hopes of the exposed persons is avoided.
There is another difference between both procedures, if HBM is
applied. Due to its set-up the Dutch approach will only cover the
internal exposure data and if necessary produce legal liability data
for likely affected persons. The German approach supplies internal
exposure data and if applicable legal liability data for not affected
and likely affected individuals. By presenting HBM results which
rule out enhanced exposure, this strategy may have an additional
positive societal impact as it helps to reassure not affected persons
that they have not been exposed to the chemical(s). With respect to
the psychological burden of the disaster relief forces resulting from
a potential exposure, its exclusion will generate relief and help
them to better cope with similar incidents in the future. HBM
results indicating enhanced exposure may be used for legal liability
issues in both approaches.
For both procedures the public and media demand for action
has to be considered. While the “public interest–legal liability
approach for the application of chemical incident HBM” can offer a
high extent of satisfaction very early in the aftermath of a chemical
incident, the “pre-deﬁned transparent procedure for early
decision-making concerning application of HBM following chemi-
cal incidents” requires an appropriate and convincing communi-
cation on a societal level, if the decision is made not to start a HBM
campaign. In the worst case speculations about possible exposure
to toxic substances may last for decades after the chemical
incident.
With respect to the preparedness, both procedures ask for a
moderate level of material and personnel. In line with their aims
the ﬁrst approach lays emphasis on the preparation of logistics,
e.g., materials for sample collection, documentation and a
laboratory network, while the second approach focuses an
information gathering, e.g. data bases and computer modeling,
to support the decision making process. In addition, the training of
the HBM executing personnel differs: the German procedure can
be conducted by common healthcare professionals, an on-site
introduction to HBM sampling using the compendium deems
possible, in contrast the Dutch procedure relies on experts trained
on the method in advance. Moreover, if HBM will be executed
additional healthcare personnel will be required.
Finally, availability and allocation of resources may be
compared. The ﬁrst approach asks for a high level of availability
and allocation of resources. An HBM campaign with a high number
of samples can only be conducted successfully with an appropriate
number of trained persons, well organized logistics and a
competent laboratory network. The second approach can already
avoid the waste of resources by a science-based decision process
not to apply HBM. In the case of HBM application, the approach can
help to identify the likely affected persons and to restrict HBM
sample collection to these individuals.
5. Conclusions
The compendium described in this article and the procedure of
Scheepers et al., 2011; Scheepers et al., 2014, this issue) form a good
starting point for the routine application of HBM in the case of a
chemical incident from a European perspective. Additional initia-
tives are on the way in Flanders (Smolders et al., 2014, this issue) and
intheUK(http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&HPAwebStandard/
HPAweb_C/1287146816461). Recently, a ﬁrst paper describing the
framework for HBM of emergency responders following disasters in
the U.S.A. has been published (Decker et al., 2013).
As discussed both approaches have advantages and limitations
which need to be further explored in the future. Therefore, thedissemination of the methods among disaster relief forces and
healthcare professionals and their training on the procedures need
to be promoted. Thus, experiences may be generated, which can be
evaluated to optimize the approaches and ultimately harmonize
them in a single guideline. In addition, recent technical develop-
ments, e.g., the determination of the cholinesterase status (http://
www.securetec.net), allowing “ﬁeld”-HBM on the disaster site and
enabling subsequent therapeutic treatment if necessary, may be
incorporated.
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